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A NOVEL AND CONTROVERSIAL TECHNOLOGY.
ARTIFICIAL FACE RECOGNITION, PRIVACY PROTECTION,
AND ALGORITHM BIAS IN EUROPE
Andrea Pin*

INTRODUCTION
Between late 2019 and mid-2020, an unprecedented controversy reached courts
in Europe.1 At stake were the thorny issues surrounding the capabilities and the risks
of using Artificial Face Recognition (AFR) during policing. While the [c]ase law
[wa]s [then] virtually non-existent,2 the responsibility to adjudicate in this field fell
upon the shoulders of British judges, who ruled largely drawing from European Union
(EU) privacy regulation, Europes First Amendment.3
It might sound quite paradoxical, and even ironic, that the two courts called to
adjudicate on what they qualified as a novel and controversial technology4 in light
of EU regulations were the High Court of Justice5 and the Court of Appeal of England
and Wales. In fact, the UK was then in the process of transitioning out of the EU. 6
Despite Brexit, R (Bridges) v. Chief Constable of South Wales Police Court of
Appeals unanimous ruling has left some legacy for other states courts as well as
for the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).7 As EU law is good law
within the remaining twenty-seven EU member states, and domestic judges must
enforce EU rules instead of incompatible domestic rules,8 the vast portion of the
Court of Appeals ruling that relies on EU law is an obvious point of reference. And
the impact of the judgment may actually spill over even beyond the EU, given its
* Associate Professor of Comparative Law at the University of Padua, Italy.
1
Bernard Keenan, Automatic Facial Recognition and the Intensification of Police Surveillance, 84 MOD. L. REV. 886, 886 (2021).
2
EU AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RTS., FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS CONSIDERATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 4 (2019).
3
Bilyana Petkova, Privacy as Europes First Amendment, 25 EUR. L.J. 140, 140 (2019).
4
R (Bridges) v. Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2020] EWCA (Civ) 1058, at
para. 201 [hereinafter Bridges II].
5
R (Bridges) v. Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2019] EWHC (Admin) 2341
[hereinafter Bridges I].
6
Brexit: What You Need to Know About the UK Leaving the EU, BBC NEWS (Dec. 30,
2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32810887 [https://perma.cc/JX4H-5HZE].
7
See Bridges II, EWCA (Civ) 1058, ¶¶ 6264.
8
EUR-LEX, Glossary of SummariesPrimacy of EU Law, https://eur-lex.europa.eu
/summary/glossary/primacy_of_eu_law.html [https://perma.cc/JTZ7-JP32] (last visited
Dec. 13, 2021).
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privacy rules ability to unilaterally influence global regulatory standards,9 thanks
also to the EUs large market.10 As U.S. companies willing to sell their products
within EU territories must comply with EU regulations,11 they will have to take into
account this judgment while crafting their AFR technologies.
Perhaps even more importantly, Bridges seems to have deeply influenced the
EUs treatment of AFR technologies. The widely known 12 Artificial Intelligence
Act13 currently under consideration by the EU devotes a specific section to AFR
technologies in the context of law enforcement, and, as we will see, many details of
the proposed legislation resonate with Bridges.14 Although there is no guarantee that
the EU will end up enacting the Bill in this form, there seems to be little doubt that
Bridges will remain a point of reference for the years to come.
All things considered, the judgment of the Court of Appeal and the events it
dealt with are a good proxy to discuss the controversial exploitation of AFR within
public policies.15 More broadly, they are a perfect chance to ponder the pros and
cons of using Artificial Intelligence (AI) capabilities to monitor the civil society by
analyz[ing] large volumes of footage and . . . recogniz[ing] faces . . . through
analyses that take a fraction of the time and effort needed for human inspection.16
AFR is getting special attention in Europe to help mitigate frequent terrorist attacks.17 Thanks to its quick development, whichaccording to some statisticshas
9

Fernanda G. Nicola & Oreste Pollicino, The Balkanization of Data Privacy Regulation,
123 W. VA. L. REV. 61, 62 (2020).
10
Id. at 6263.
11
Id. at 62.
12
Carly Kind, Containing the Canary in the AI Coalminethe EUs Efforts to Regulate
Biometrics, ADA LOVELACE INST. (Apr. 30, 2021), https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/blog
/canary-ai-coalmine-eu-regulate-biometrics [https://perma.cc/SM7A-N5VP] (While only
a week old, the Commissions proposal has already achieved an impressive feat: it has shifted
the policy window away from a conversation about whether to regulate artificial intelligence,
opening up a new discourse about how to regulate artificial intelligence.).
13
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Laying Down
Harmonised Rules on Artificial Intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act) and Amending Certain
Union Legislative Acts, COM (2021) 206 final (Apr. 21, 2021) [hereinafter Proposal for
Harmonised Rules on AI].
14
See id. at art. 5.
15
Madalina Busuioc, Accountable Artificial Intelligence: Holding Algorithms to Account,
81 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 825, 827 (2021) ([C]alls for mechanisms to improve AI algorithm
transparency and for public regulation are sharply on the risefor instance, of facial recognition.).
16
Aziz Z. Huq, Constitutional Rights in the Machine-Learning State, 105 CORNELL L.
REV. 1875, 1877 (2020).
17
211 Terrorist Attacks Carried Out in EU Member States in 2015, New Europol Report
Reveals, EUROPOL (July 20, 2016), https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/211-ter
rorist-attacks-carried-out-in-eu-member-states-in-2015-new-europol-report-reveals [https://
perma.cc/43FN-CUZ8] (In 2015 there were 211 terrorist attacks within the EU); Terrorism
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seen its failure rate decrease from 5% to 0.2% in eight years,18 AFR could play an
important role in patrolling cities, prosecuting terrorists, and discouraging emulation. This is more than just a plausible scenario, as [i]n a number of European
countries, facial recognition technologies are [already] being tested or used in different
contexts in both private and public spheres.19 The list includes Hungary, Czech
Republic, Germany, France, Sweden,20 and Italy.21 It is no surprise, however, that it
was the British courts that pioneered the case law on this subject, as its police have
been particularly active in experimenting with live facial recognition technologies.22
The global pandemic increased interest in the development and the deployment
of AFR in Europe and elsewhere.23 Many countries have already bet on the AFRs
capabilities to fight the spread of the disease. Since this minimally invasive technology . . . is significantly more discreet and anatomically noninvasive than other
methods of collecting under-the-skin biometric data,24 it is becoming increasingly
important.25 Tracing the contagion,26 identifying and isolating individuals who do
not wear masks where they are compulsory27 or violate their quarantine,28 have
become a priority for societies trying to contain the virus without freezing social
mobility and the economy.29 South Korea has implemented a holistic approach to
in EuropeStatistics & Facts, STATISTA (Oct. 12, 2020), https://www.statista.com/topics
/3788/terrorism-in-europe/ [https://perma.cc/H4GK-KNZV] (The number fell to 119 in 2019,
which was the lowest in years.).
18
Sovantharith Seng, Mahdi Nasrullah Al-ameen & Matthew Wright, A First Look into
Users Perceptions of Facial Recognition in the Physical World, 105 COMPUTS. & SEC. 1,
2 (2021).
19
See EU AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RTS., supra note 2, at 3.
20
See id.
21
Francesco Dughiero, Acquisizioni video nel contesto urbano: la c.d. Face Recognition
nel panorama italiano, IL QUOTIDIANO GIURIDICO (Mar. 11, 2021), https://www.quotidiano
giuridico.it/documents/2021/03/11/acquisizioni-video-nel-contesto-urbano-la-c-d-face-rec
ognition-nel-panorama-italiano [https://perma.cc/4W4S-J3TW].
22
EU AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RTS., supra note 2, at 11.
23
Facial Recognition 2021 and BeyondTrends and Market, I-SCOOP (2021), https://
www.i-scoop.eu/facial-recognition/ [https://perma.cc/MQL2-5NL8] (The facial recognition
technology market gets driven by the COVID-19 pandemic.).
24
Meredith Van Natta et al., The Rise and Regulation of Thermal Facial Recognition
Technology during the COVID-19 Pandemic, 7 J. L. & BIOSCIENCES 1, 7 (2020).
25
Id. at 5.
26
Nicola Luigi Bragazzi et al., How Big Data and Artificial Intelligence Can Help Better
Manage the COVID-19 Pandemic, 17 INTL J. ENVT RSCH. & PUB. HEALTH 1, 23, 5 (2020).
27
Mohamed Loey et al., A Hybrid Deep Transfer Learning Model with Machine Learning
Methods for Face Mask Detection in the Era of the COVID-19 Pandemic, 167 MEASUREMENT
1, 2 (2020).
28
EUR. PARL., WHAT IF WE COULD FIGHT CORONAVIRUS WITH ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE? (2020).
29
Van Natta et al., supra note 24, at 17.
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fighting the pandemic that includes security camera footage, facial recognition technology, bank card records, and global positioning system.30 Other tools, such as
thermal-imaging wearable glasses that similarly detect temperatures of up to twohundred people and can be paired with facial recognition software, were developed
in China and marketed in the United States.31 Australias anti-pandemic policy similarly
includes drones equipped with thermal recognition technology.32 The widespread
requirement of wearing masks, which obstructs the face recognition process,33 has
further boosted technological development.34 Chinese police are using a technology
that can purportedly identify individuals and their temperature within groups of up
to thirty people with the 95% accuracy, even though they are wearing masks.35
AFR raises numerous eyebrows, however, and for good reasons. AFR has the
capacity to become a tool of limitless surveillance,36 confirming the perception
that [w]e are surrounded,37 especially within the most populated urban areas.38 The
adoption of AFR tools and AFR-based policies are particularly problematic for the
Old Continent. The EU has progressively developed its approach to contemporary
technology around the value of privacy, both through its own regulation and by
entrenching the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR),39 which similarly
requires that its forty-seven member statesranging from Portugal to Russia, from
Finland to Cyprusprotect privacy.40
Bridges showcases the variety and the thickness of the legal, ethical, and political
considerations that lie underneath the deployment of AFR-based police tools and its
ramification within Europe and beyond.41 More broadly, the topic of [f]acial recognition technologies provide[s] a useful case study of the complex and unpredictable
30

Sera Whitelaw, Applications of Digital Technology in COVID-19 Pandemic Planning
and Response, 2 LANCET 435, 436 (2020).
31
Van Natta et al., supra note 24, at 5.
32
Id. at 6.
33
AI and Control of Covid-19 Coronavirus, COUNCIL OF EUR., https://www.coe.int/en
/web/artificial-intelligence/ai-and-control-of-covid-19-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/8EN4
-KC58] (last visited Dec. 13, 2021).
34
See Van Natta et al., supra note 24, at 5.
35
Id.
36
FRANK PASQUALE, NEW LAWS OF ROBOTICS: DEFENDING HUMAN EXPERTISE IN THE
AGE OF AI 131 (2020) (internal quotations omitted).
37
JOSHUA A.T. FAIRFIELD, OWNED: PROPERTY, PRIVACY, AND THE NEW DIGITAL SERFDOM
52 (2017).
38
Id. at 65, 67.
39
Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union art. 6, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 1[hereinafter Treaty on European Union].
40
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 8,
Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. 5 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter European Convention
on Human Rights].
41
Keenan, supra note 1, at 89395.
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ways that norms of procedural fairness, equality, and privacy interact when the state
deploys machine-learning tools to draw inferences from otherwise unilluminating
data.42 This Article uses Bridges as a proxy to sketch out the main legal issues that
arise from AFRs policy deployment in Europe. After a quick summary of the facts
and of the judgment of the court of first instance, it provides a detailed account of
the Court of Appeals judgment. Then it focuses on how the Court of Appeals balanced
competing interests and how this resonates with EU rules. Finally it compares
Bridges with the Artificial Intelligence Act issued by the European Commission.
I. THE MAGNITUDE OF THE PROBLEM AND THE FIRST EUROPEAN CASE
The EU has the reputation of having created a unicum, an innovative and pervasive right to data protection and right to privacy, that has transfigured . . . other
legal systems.43 The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights44 protects private life45 and
personal data.46 The EU abides by the ECHR,47 which also protects private life.48
42

Huq, supra note 16, at 1900.
Nicola & Pollicino, supra note 9, at 67.
44
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C
326) 2.
45
Id. at art. 7 (Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home
and communications.).
46
Id. at art. 8, stating:
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning
him or her.
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on
the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other
legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access
to data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the
right to have it rectified.
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an
independent authority.
47
See Treaty on European Union, supra note 39, at art. 6, stating:
2. The Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Such accession
shall not affect the Unions competences as defined in the Treaties.
3. Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and
as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Unions law.
48
See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 40, stating:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and
43

296

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 30:291

The most relevant body of law in the field of data protection, however, is the
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),49 which entered into force in 2016
replacing an earlier piece of legislation on the same subject.50 As AFR processes
facial images through specific technical means allowing the unique identification
or authentication of a natural person, it captures biometric data that is accorded
special protection under the GDPR.51
The AFR has the potential of becoming a dangerous tool of mass surveillance
for at least two reasons, which Bridges emphasized. First, it is much less socially
transparent than other means of biometric surveillance such as fingerprints. In fact,
it collects peoples personal information without requiring cooperation or even
knowledge of the individuals whose information is collected.52 Second, its scale of
surveillance is vast. Bridges dealt with the South Welsh polices deployment of AFR
within a two-year span, between May 2017 and April 2019.53 The police deployed
their AFR tool during events of some popular interests, including the final match of
the Champions League soccer finals, for a total of fifty deployments.54 Thanks to the
softwares capacity to process up to fifty people per second,55 the total sum of faces
processed within the two years amounted to 500,000,56 which makes up roughly for
one-sixth of the total Welsh population. Of course, this does not mean that such a
high portion of Welsh population was caught on AFR cameras. Many non-Welsh
individuals likely participated in the events during which the technology was deployed, such as during the soccer final, and many might have been caught on camera
more than once. But the number is still indicative of the type of surveillance to
which AFR can give birth to. As the judicial dispute exemplifies and this Article
explains, the EUs response to what seems to be a formidable privacy threat consists
of putting boundaries on such a powerful technology, without ruling it out. Both EU
law and Bridges keep the door open to AFR but set some limits and requisites.

is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country,
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health
or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
49
Council Regulation 2016/679 of April 27, 2016, General Data Protection Regulation,
2016 O.J. (L 119) 1.
50
Id.
51
See EU AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RTS., supra note 2, at 5.
52
Bridges II, EWCA (Civ) 1058 ¶ 23.
53
Id. ¶ 11.
54
Id.; 2,000 Wrongly Matched with Possible Criminals at Champions League, BBC
(May 4, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-wales-south-west-wales-44007872 [https://
perma.cc/QPQ2-G7KH].
55
Bridges II, ¶ 16.
56
Id.
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A. The Issues of Bridges
In October 2018, Edward Bridges, a civil liberties campaigner living in Cardiff,
sued the South Wales Police for using AFR Locate, a tool based on the NeoFace
Watch software that the police used to experiment patrolling areas in which public
events were held between 2017 and 2019.57 The Divisional Court of the Queens
Bench Division, which acted as a court of first instance, found that the usage of AFR
Locate was legitimate. Then Bridges appealed on narrower grounds.
What follows is a summary of the facts of the case and of the Divisional Courts
ruling, and a thorough analysis of the Court of Appeal that focuses on the main takeaways for EU and the State Parties of the European Convention of Human Rights.
It will therefore devote most of its attention to the first two complaints and elaborate
on the Court of Appeals analysis of AFRs discriminatory potential.
B. AFR Locate
The South Wales Police deployed AFR Locate in an overt manner. They installed
the cameras that captured faces on poles, posts, or police vehicles; they posted warnings
about its usage; police officers handed out leaflets explaining to the people roaming
within the patrolled area that their face images could be captured and processed.58
AFR Locate operates by looking for face matches from a South Wales Police
database of photographs.59 The watch-list has the technological capacity of twothousand images, but the list utilized during the experimentation oscillated between
four-hundred and eight-hundred people.60 The list included persons wanted on warrants, individuals who had escaped custody, people suspected of having committed
crimes, persons in need of protection, individuals whose presence at a certain event
was of concern, people of interest for intelligence purposes, and persons considered
to be vulnerable.61 The system generates a similarity score between the faces on
the watch-list and those that are detected.62 The score quantifies the probability that
a given individual corresponds to one on the watch-list.63 The operator of the system
sets a threshold value for similarity scores above which the software will alert the
operator of a potential match.64 When the software identifies a possible match, a
police officer compares the camera image with the watch-list one.65 Only if the
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Id. ¶ 1, 4.
Id. ¶ 19.
Id. ¶ 13.
Id. ¶ 13.
Id.
Id. ¶ 9.
Id.
Keenan, supra note 1, at 887.
Bridges II, ¶ 15.
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officer confirms the match will other officers stationed nearby be notified.66 AFR
Locate also collects metadata, such as time and location, that is associated with the
image, and the matches between the watch-list and the captured face image.67
The Standard Operating Procedures and Data Protection Impact Assessment
in force at the Southern Welsh Police put limits on the storage of the information
gathered by AFR Locate.68 AFR Locate does not retain the facial biometrics in case
of no match and the camera feed is deleted after thirty-one days, in accordance with
UK regulations on standard feed retention.69 The facial image of a match record is
stored within AFR Locate for up to twenty-four hours, while information about the
match lasts within the system for thirty-one days.70 AFR Locate also deletes the
watch-lists images within twenty-four hours after the deployment. 71
C. The Facts of the Case and the Divisional Courts Ruling
Bridges complained that AFR Locate had captured his image on two occasions.72
The first event he mentioned took place on December 21, 2017, while he was visiting
a busy shopping area of Cardiff.73 The second occasion was on March 27, 2018,
when he was attending the Defence Procurement, Research, Technology and Exportability Exhibition.74 He claimed that in neither case he had been warned that he could
be caught on camera by AFR Locate.75
On the first occasion, AFR Locate operated for eight hours and searched for
matches within three watch-lists, which included people being suspected of having
committed a serious crime, people wanted on warrants, and suspects.76 AFR Locate
then returned ten possible matches, out of which two turned out to be wrong.77 On
the second occasion, the police deployed AFR Locate in consideration of what
happened during an earlier annual Exhibition, when bomb hoax calls had disrupted
the event.78 The watch-list included people who had been arrested in the past at the
same event, or those with outstanding warrants, and other suspects.79 There was one
match, which turned out to be correct.80
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80

Id.
Id. ¶ 21.
Id. ¶ 18.
Id. ¶ 10.
Id. ¶ 10.
Id.
Id. ¶ 25.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 27.
Id. ¶ 26.
Id.
Id. ¶ 28.
Id.
Id. ¶ 29.
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Bridges complained both that the police had used such technology against him
twice and that they could do so in the future (interestingly enough, there was no evidence that AFR Locate had captured Bridgess facial images, as the recordings had
been duly destroyed in the meantime, in compliance with the police rules).81 More
specifically, he complained that the usage of AFR Locate was in breach of (1) Article 8 of the ECHR, which protects private life; (2) data protection regulation, as
enshrined in the Data Protection Acts (DPA) of 1998 and 2018; and (3) the Public
Sector Equality Duty (PSED).82 The Divisional Court issued its ruling on September
4, 2019. It conceded that, despite being manifest in public, AFR-derived biometric data [wa]s information of an intrinsically private character and was therefore
covered by Article 8 of the ECHR.83 Article 8 ECHR states that:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family
life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with
the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection
of the rights and freedoms of others.84
The Divisional Court found that AFR Locate met Article 8s requirement.85 In fact, the
Court noted, the police enjoyed a legal basis for such practice: using cameras to obtain
biometric data fell within their common law powers and was justified by the public interests involved, which revolved around safety and crime prevention and prosecution.86
Regarding the DPA, the Divisional Court also found that the usage of AFR was
compatible with the existing regulations.87 In fact, in pursuance of Article 35 of the
GDPR, the DPA required that where a type of processing is likely to result in a
high risk to the rights and freedoms of individuals, a data protection impact
assessment was needed.88 In the Divisional Courts eyes, the police had duly completed such an assessment.
In a nutshell, the Divisional Court found that the common law police powers
provided the police with the necessary legal ground; that the process was carried out
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88

Id. ¶ 34.
Id. ¶ 52.
Id. ¶ 36.
European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 40.
Bridges II, EWCA (Civ) 1058 ¶ 2.
See id. ¶ 38.
Id. at 86.
Id. ¶ 29.
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on the basis of a policy document that the police had duly put in place; that a data
protection impact assessment had been carried out; and that AFR Locate was strictly
necessary for the purpose of law enforcement.89
Finally, the Divisional Court considered and dismissed the claim that the use of
AFT Locate could cause impermissible gender or ethnic discrimination, which were
prohibited under the DPED.90 The Court, in fact, found no evidence that the software
that AFR Locate was discriminating against female or minority ethnic individuals
by producing higher rates of positive matches.
The Divisional Court disagreed with the police on a key point. The police had
put forward the argument that only individuals included in the watch-lists could
claim that their biometric information had been processed and therefore seek legal
protection.91 In fact, the Court noted, everyone captured by the cameras had been
processed and uniquely identified, regardless of whether the software had returned
any matches with the watch-lists.92
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS RULING
When Bridges appealed, he had already won on a key point. The Divisional
Court had decided that face recognition ending with no match still constituted processing biometric data as defined under the DPA.93 This meant that anyone caught
on camera was covered by regulations regarding sensitive personal data. Of course,
given that the recordings were canceled shortly after the deployment of AFR Locate,
it was impossible to determine whether someone who was not within a watch-list
had been caught on camera, as happened to Bridges. As a result, anyone claiming
to have been in the surroundings during an AFR Locate deployment could sue in
court.
When appealing the first ruling, Bridges distilled a series of claims. Some of
them revolved around the protection of his private life under Article 8 of the ECHR
and the Human Rights Act 1998, which the UK introduced to domesticate the
ECHRs protection; some pertained to the protection that the UK granted him in
pursuance of the EUs GDPR; one argued for the violation of equality under the
PSED.94 All in all, virtually all the claims that Bridges made stemmed either from
EU law or the ECHR. The ruling is therefore extremely relevant for the great deal
of countries that are EU members or parties to the Convention.
89
90
91
92
93
94

See id. ¶¶ 5051.
See Bridges II, EWCA (Civ) 1058 ¶ 52.
Id. ¶ 89.
Id. ¶ 53.
See id.; supra notes 8788 and accompanying text.
Id. ¶ 91.

2021]

A NOVEL AND CONTROVERSIAL TECHNOLOGY

301

A. The Legal Background for the AFR Locates Deployment and Article 8
ECHRs Protection of Private Life
The first issue that the Court tackled was whether the deployment of AFR Locate
was consistent with Article 8 of the ECHR.95 As to the requisite that there be a sufficient legal ground, the Court of Appeals prima facie answer was in the positive.96 The
Court of Appeal shared the Divisional Courts view that the legislation and the policy
of the South Wales Police provided some background for the deployment of AFR. 97
The Court then turned to the specificities of the case at stake. The casethe
Court notedwas novel.98 The South Wales Police had mistakenly analogized the
capture of facial features with taking photographs or using CCTV cameras.99 But the
two scenarios differed on three decisive grounds. First, AFR Locate involve[d] the
capturing of the images and processing of digital information of a large number of
members of the public, in circumstances in which . . . the vast majority of them will
be of no interest whatsoever to the police.100 Second, the gathering of facial biometrics was different from ordinary photographs, as it concerned sensitive personal
data.101 Third, the data was processed in an automated way.102
Overall, the Court found that AFR and its protocol were so invasive of individual privacy that they needed to be based on a particularly detailed legal framework.103
The Court of Appeals in-depth analysis found that the unique potential of AFR
required a more robust and detailed legal framework than what the South Wales
Police had put in place.104 Compared with the requirements of Article 8 of the ECHR,
the protocols on the deployment and utilization of AFR Locate gave too much discretion to the police in handling the technology.105
More specifically, the Court noted, the legal background failed to specify two
critical aspects of the AFRs deployments: who could be included in the watch-list,
and the criteria determining where AFR could be deployed.106 The South Wales
Police documents in this field only required the existence of a proper law enforcement purpose, for which the deployment had to be considered as necessary.107
But no further specification was available. Moreover, the document itself specified
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107

See id. ¶ 2.
Id. ¶ 92.
See id. ¶ 69.
Id. ¶ 86.
Id. ¶ 85.
Id. ¶ 87.
Id. ¶ 88.
Id. ¶ 89.
See Keenan, supra note 1, at 891.
Bridges II, EWCA (Civ) 1058 ¶¶ 90, 9394.
Id. ¶ 91.
Id.
Id. ¶ 92.
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that the software discarded the facial biometrics for which there was no match in the
watch-list, but did not make this procedure an explicit requirement as a requisite for
the deployment of AFR Locate.108 Overall, there was no guarantee that the discretionary usage of the software could not target specific individuals by trying to locate
and track them down: it will often, perhaps always, be the case that the location will
be determined by whether the police have reason to believe that people on the watch-list
are going to be at that location.109 To put it shortly, behind a veneer of neutrality,
the police could exploit AFR Locate to arbitrarily chase specific individuals.
B. The Protection of Privacy and the Discretionary Policy Powers
The Court of Appeal then moved on to address the challenges revolving around
EU law. The Court recalled that, according to the DPA 2018 that incorporated the
GDPRs privacy regulation,110 the processing of personal data for law enforcement
purposes was legitimate only if was done with the subjects consent or was necessary.111
More specifically, sensitive processinga concept that included AFR Locates
operationswas allowed only when strictly necessary for the purpose of enforcing
the law and had to be carried out in accordance with an appropriate policy document.112
The Court reviewed the relevant documents in place, focusing on the Surveillance Camera Code of Practice, which the British Secretary of State for the Home
Department had issued in June 2013.113 The Code, the Court noted, did make general
reference to AFR, but did not deal with it specifically.114 Another document of
interest for the Court was the guidance published by the Surveillance Camera Commissioner in March 2019, entitled The Police Use of Automated Facial Recognition
Technology with Surveillance Camera System.115 The Court also noted that this text
used very general terms, without specifying who could be put on a watch-list and
where AFR [could] be deployed, although both aspects were critical for its legitimacy.116 Neither did the South Wales Police Standard Operating Procedure document, which described how AFR Locate worked and standards for narrowing down
the pool of people that could end up on the list.117 As a result, the Court was of the view
that the existing legal framework did not provide enough details to circumscribe and
108
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later to review specific deployments of AFR Locate, therefore leaving too much
discretion to the police.118
The Court concluded by noting that, notwithstanding the breadth of AFR
deploymentsAFR Locate was being tested in all event types ranging from high
volume music and sporting events to indoor arenas119no public authority in the
UK had issued sufficient guidelines or protocols to constrain it.120 The Court thus
found ample evidence that AFR Locate did not have adequate boundaries.
C. The Requisites of the Privacy Assessment
The third ground for appeal also revolved around the compliance of AFR
Locates deployment policies with the regulations stemming from the UKs membership in the EU.121 Now at stake was Section 64 of the Data Protection Act 2018,
which requires that a Data Protection Impact Assessment before biometric
processing.122 The Assessment should include a description of the processing operations, the risks to the rights and freedoms of data subjects, the measures
intended to protect them, and the additional safeguards that should be put in place. 123
Once again, Bridges claimed that the Assessment did not consider the protection of
Article 8 of the ECHR adequately, and that it overlooked the fact that AFR Locate
processed the facial biometrics also of those who did not have a match in the watchlists.124 He thus reiterated his concern for the AFR Locates ambitious scale of the
collection of biometric data and its blanket and indiscriminate basis.125
The Court of Appeal repeated its statement about the excessive discretionary
powers of the police in deploying AFR Locate.126 The Court now agreed with
Bridges that the Data Protection Impact Assessment had also failed to address the
selection of the individuals to put on watch-lists and the locations within which the
software would be deployed.127 Consequently, the Assessment had failed to address
the discretionary powers that surrounded the watch-lists and the places where the
software had to be deployed.128
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D. The Existence of an Appropriate Policy Document
The Court of Appeal then moved to consider Section 42 of the Data Protection
Act 2018. Section 42 sets out the requisites of an appropriate policy document in
the field of sensitive processing.129 It states that such a document needs to [e]xplain
the controllers procedures for securing compliance with the data protection principles, including the retention and erasure of personal data.130 Bridges complained
that the Divisional Court had urged the South Wales Police to provide the document
with more details, thus leaving to the police itself the duty to implement them, while
it should have made a judgment on the matter.131 The Court of Appeal, however,
found that the Divisional Court did assess the documents contents: the Information
Commissionerthe independent privacy regulatory authority in the UKalso found
the document to be in compliance with Article 42 of the Data Protection Act.132
E. The Public Sector Equality Duty
The fifth and final ground of appeal revolved around the Equality Act 2010,
which included the Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED).133 Both documents are a result of the UKs membership of the EU.134 Section 149(1) of the Equality Act requires
that public authorities eliminate discrimination, advance equality of opportunity,
and foster good relations between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it.135 Bridges complained that the South Wales
Police failed to assess the potential AFRs discrimination in the fields of race and
sex, which are protected by the Equality Act.136
The Court of Appeal here distanced itself from the Divisional Court. The latter
had found no evidence of race or sex discrimination and dismissed the complaint rather
easily, devoting a very little part of its opinion to the subject.137 On the contrary, the
Court of Appeal embarked on a rather in-depth analysis of the possibility that AFR
129
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includes discrimination.138 Its ruling on this matter thus resonated strongly with the
broader concerns aired by data scientists that AFR systems may embed racial and
sex biases139 and therefore threaten civil rights,140 especially in the contexts of law
enforcement.141
Bridges argued that the South Wales Police contravened the PSEDs positive
duty to evaluate the potential race and sex biases and that they did not give due
regard to the need to eliminate such discrimination.142 After carrying out an initial
assessment in 2017, Bridges argued, the police failed to follow up and review their
assessment of the potentially discriminatory impact of AFR thereafter.143
Bridges had failed to persuade the Divisional Court. That Court had even seen
an air of unreality in Bridgess argument that AFR Locates algorithm could
include racial or sex biases.144 The Court of Appeal adamantly rejected the Divisional Courts approach, stating that [o]n the contrary, [the complaint about discrimination seemed] to raise a serious issue of public concern, which ought to be
considered properly by the South Wales Police.145
The Court of Appeal clarified what PSED required from public powers. The
PSED, it stated, is a duty of process and not outcome.146 The fact that what was
due was a process and not a result, however, did not diminish its importance 147:
Public law is often concerned with the process by which a decision is taken and not with the substance of that decision. This is
for at least two reasons. First, good processes are more likely to
lead to better informed, and therefore better, decisions. Secondly,
whatever the outcome, good processes help to make public
authorities accountable to the public.148
PSEDs duty of process discharged a critical role for the integration of AI-based tools
within public policies, as it helped to reassure members of the public, whatever their
138
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race or sex, that their interests have been properly taken into account before policies
are formulated or brought into effect.149
Overall, the Court of Appeal concluded that the PSED is so important [because] it requires a public authority to give thought to the potential impact of a new
policy which may appear to it to be neutral but which may turn out in fact to have
a disproportionate impact on certain sections of the population.150 This approach
required that public authorities make sure that they do not inadvertently overlook
information which [they] should take into account in matters of quality.151
Having set the ground for further reflections, the Court of Appeal then noticed
that the Divisional Court was particularly impressed by two aspects.152 First, the
Divisional Court emphasized that in cases of a positive match, the software did not
trigger immediate human intervention.153 In fact, two human beings, including at
least one police officer, had to decide to act on the positive match.154 Secondly,
the Divisional Court was persuaded by the statements of Dominic Edgell, an officer in
the South Wales Polices Digital Services Division, who testified as an expert in the
field that there was virtually no difference in the statistics as to race and gender.155
The Court of Appeal disagreed with the Divisional Court on both grounds.
The Court of Appeal found that the human intervention was not sufficient to
fulfil the PSEDs duty to pursue equality.156 In fact, human beings [could] also make
mistakes; and this was particularly acknowledged in the context of identification.157
After all, the Court noted, in criminal trials juries are routinely given warnings . . .
about how identification can be mistaken, in particular where a person has never
seen the person being identified before.158 Critical for the Court, however, was that
the South Wales Police had not obtain[ed] information for themselves about the
possible bias which the software they use[d] may have [had].159 In the Court of
Appeals eyes, such a superficial approach was sufficient to conclude that the police
had not met the PSEDs requirement.
As to the witnesses testimony, the Court also disagreed with the Divisional Court.
The Court of Appeal found the statements offered by Dominic Edgell, to which the
Divisional Court had attached great weight, to be unpersuasive.160 Edgell reviewed
the deployments of AFR Locate after the FIFA Champions League final and between
149
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mid-2017 until mid-2018 and found no evidence of bias.161 Throughout that period,
AFR Locate generated 290 alerts: 82 were true positives, while 208 were false positives.162 From the point of view of sex, within the group of individuals who alerted
the system, 65% were males, and 34% of this group were true positives.163 Within the
female group, only 18%a smaller minoritywere true positives.164 Female false
alerts primarily derived from matches to two individuals within the watch-list whom
the AFR software provider referred to as lamb.165 A person is considered a lamb
if her face has such generic features that it generates a particularly high number of
false matches.166 From the point of view of the race, 98% of the true positives were
white north European, while 98.5% of the false positives were also white north
European.167
Considering the statistics, the Court was not persuaded with Edgells view that
the software did comply with PSED. It emphasized that the software could indeed have
an inbuilt bias, which need[ed] to be tested.168 Anil Jain, a computer science scholar,
reinforced this impression when he testified that AFR technologys performance
largely depended on the training datasets.169 A demographically unbalanced dataset
easily results in software biases and therefore demographically uneven false alerts. 170
As details about the software were not available because of their commercial
sensitivity, the Court of Appeal noted that the South Wales Police and its witnesses provided very generic statements, such as the routine updating of the software and witness
statements that the algorithms training did include individuals of various ethnic
groups.171 This did not satisfy the Court of Appeal, which, after Jains testimony, was
of the view that [a]s a minimum for confirming whether an AFR system is biased, the
database statistics, such as the number of males to females, and different races considered, would need to be known.172 The Court thus concluded that the South Wales
Police did not fulfil the PSED requirements, as it did not have sufficient information
to verify that the software program in this case [did] not have an unacceptable bias
on grounds of race and sex.173
The Court accepted that the police did not have knowledge of the specifics of
AFR Locate because of nondisclosure policies, but this did not exempt them from
161
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their own, non-delegable, duty to pursue equality under PSED.174 The Court thus
hoped that:
[A]s AFR is a novel and controversial technology, all police
forces that intend to use it in the future would wish to satisfy
themselves that everything reasonable which could be done had
been done in order to make sure that the software used does not
have a racial or gender bias.175
This last ground of appeal, which found the South Wales Police impermissibly
relying on belief in the absence of software bias, is a memento for the public and
institutions alike that AI tools are uneven across racial, gender, and age lines.176
The Court of Appeal showed deep awareness of the potential for machine error and
unfair discrimination in the context of automated decision-making and profiling.177
The Divisional Courts judgment that quickly dismissed the discrimination claim
seemed to incorporate the belief that generally speaking, algorithms are equalitarian
and nondiscriminatory.178 In doing so, however, the Divisional Court rejected both
scientific evidence and legal values.179 As has become apparent, AI-based technology
can encode human biases, blind spots, or otherwise normatively troubling assumptions or regularities derived from training data, outcome variables or other design
margins.180 AFR is no exception; actually, it epitomizes the phenomenon, as the biases
it embeds can fight the process of face recognition itself by misidentifying facial
images.181 The problem has already surfaced time and again in the United States, where
AFR techniques have misidentified criminals, leading to the arrest of innocent people
just because the software returned wrong matches.182 The Divisional Courts superficial consideration of the issue was also at odds with the heightened legal concern for
the risks of discrimination. In fact, legal discrimination may be unintended, indirect,
or non-comparative. The focus [must be] on the effect on the victim.183
174
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Overall, the Court of Appeals judgment confirms the impression that, according
to European law and European legal culture more broadly, human beings discharging public offices may seek support, and not replacement, in automated processes.184
Limiting the role of AI in law enforcement may not be enough to avoid distortions,
however. One of the aspects of utmost concern in deploying AI-based tools is the interaction between the algorithmic output and the human decision-maker.185 Humans
may excessively rely on algorithms and be reluctant to scrutinize their outputs closely.
As human agents may be prone to accept rather than challenge AFR Locate, the
Court of Appeals decision was right in emphasizing that police protocols embedding
AI tools must be informed by a strong awareness that automated processes may include
biases and try to prevent them, without relying too much on human oversight.
The Court of Appeals approach resonates with the EUs take on discrimination
and is therefore likely to have an impact on future cases and on the adoption of AFR
tools. Although EU law does not prescribe specific positive measures to prevent discrimination,186 it does, however, shift part of the burden of proof from the subject
claiming to have been discriminated against to the respondent.187 Requiring that police
forces demonstrate that they have taken into proper account the risk of discrimination
while deploying AFR technologies, as the Court of Appeal has done, echoes that shift.
III. BALANCING COMPETING INTERESTS: THE COURT OF APPEALS TAKE
In deciding that AFR Locates deployment lacked a sufficient legal framework,
the Court of Appeal made some additional observations on how to test whether the
utilization of such a tool was a proportionate limitation on the rights of an individual.188 Strictly speaking, there was no need for the Court to do so, as AFR Locate
already lacked the preliminary requisite of a legal basis for such limitation. The
Court of Appeal did not specify why it decided to assess the proportionality of the
measure at stake; it likely did so, however, because the proportionality scrutiny is
184
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the standard way through which the EU Court of Justice, the European Court of Human
Rights, and several Continental courts review public policies that interfere with
fundamental rights.189 The Court of Appeals observations are therefore particularly
significant, as they will likely provide other judges, within as well as outside the
UK, with a template around which they can build their own judgments and public
authorities can shape their own policies of AFR deployment.
The Court of Appeal reflected on the proportionality assessment required by
Article 8 ECHR.190 In the UKs judicial analysis, a limitation of a Conventions right
is justified only if (I) the objective of the measure pursued is sufficiently important
to justify the limitation; (II) the limitation is rationally connected to its objective;
(III) there is no less intrusive measure [that] could have been used without unacceptably compromising the objective; and (IV) having regard to these matters and
to the severity of the consequences, a fair balance has been struck between the rights
of the individual and the interests of the community.191
The Court of Appeal focused on the last prong of this test, namely the balancing
between the individuals rights and the communitys interests, as this was the only
part of the test that Bridges criticized.192 The Divisional Court had found the balance
struck to be legitimate, as AFR Locate was deployed in an open and transparent
way, with significant public engagement . . . [I]t was used for a limited time, and
covered a limited footprint. It was deployed for the specific and limited purpose of
seeking to identify particular individuals . . . . Moreover, with the exception of
Bridges, [n]obody complained as to their treatment and [a]ny interference with
the [appellant]s Article 8 rights would have been very limited.193
In the Court of Appeal, Bridges made two arguments. First, he noted that the
Divisional Court had made a proportionality assessment based on the actual result
of an operation, not on its anticipated benefits.194 In other words, Bridges argued
that the assessment evaluated the results of the deployment of AFR Locate, whereas
it should have considered the expectations that the police had when they decided to
use this tool. The Court of Appeal dismissed this charge easily: as the police looked
for significant numbers of individuals, while the matches were few, an ex ante
proportionality assessment of the measure would have been more in favor of the
police rather than of the appellant.195
Bridgess second argument targeted how the Divisional Court examined the cost
side of the proportionality balance.196 In fact, the appellant explained, measuring the
189
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interference did not mean considering only the infringement of the appellants right
to private life, but also of all other members of the public who participated in the
events in which the appellant could have been caught on camera.197 The Court also
dismissed this argument on two grounds. First, it emphasized that the substance of
the complaint of Bridges against the deployment of AFR Locate was about him,
not anyone else.198 Second, the Court stressed, measuring the impact of an interference with a fundamental right on a group of people did not mean adding up the
number of interferences arithmetically to end up with a total sum.199 The balancing
exercise which the principle of proportionality require[d] [wa]s not a mathematical
one; it [wa]s an exercise which call[ed] for judgment.200 The Court of Appeal thus
offered one important insight on how to evaluate public policies interferences with
fundamental rightsnamely, that measuring the impact of the interference on a
wider public does not end up in an arithmetic sum, but in a legal analysis of the
interests involved.201
IV. BRIDGES AND THE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE ACT
In an attempt to keep abreast of AI developments, EU institutions are considering
introducing the Artificial Intelligence Act.202 This piece of legislation would strengthen
the legal framework for trustworthy AI203 through a uniform EU regulation 204 that
apples to providers of AI systems . . . irrespective of whether they are established
within the [EU] or in a third country, and to users of AI systems established within
the [EU].205 The proposal aims to lay down the minimum necessary requirements
to address the risks and problems linked to AI, avoid creating unnecessary restrictions to trade, or jeopardizing the market of technologies,206 while still addressing
the opacity, complexity, bias, a certain degree of unpredictability and partially autonomous behavior of certain AI systems, and ensuring their compatibility with
fundamental rights.207 The balance that the Act strikes displays awareness of the
fact that AFR technologies can evoke a feeling of constant surveillance and indirectly
197
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dissuade the exercise of the freedom of assembly and other fundamental rights,208
clearly echoing Bridgess fears.
The Act takes on a risk-based approach,209 as it identifies uses of AI that create
acceptable, high, and low or minimal risks.210 Each rank has its own requirement. On
a general level, remote biometric identification of natural persons in publicly accessible
places211 is considered a high-risk use of AI.212 The Act requires that high-risk practices take place only under human supervision,213 which is one of the cornerstones
of Bridges.
The Act, however, draws a distinction between real-time and post remote
biometric identifications.214 In the former case the capturing of the biometric data,
the comparison and the identification occur all instantaneously, near-instantaneously
or in any event without a significant delay.215 The distinction is relevant because
the Act introduces a general prohibition of using real-time remote biometric
identification systems in publicly accessible spaces for the purpose of law enforcement.216 The uses of such technology to identify individuals in real-time for
purposes other than law enforcement thus do not suffer from the same limitation,
although they are still qualified as high-risk practices.217 The special attention that
the Act devotes to AFR technologies therefore coincides with Bridges, as the
deployment of AFR Locate was done in public spaces, through a real-time
protocol, and for the purpose of law enforcement.218 The analogies do not end up
here, however.
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The Act explicitly prohibits the use of real-time AFR recognition systems for
the purpose of law enforcement, unless and in as far as such use is strictly necessary
for the achievement of a narrow list of objectives: (1) searching for specific potential
victims of crime; (2) preventing specific, substantial and imminent threat to the life
or physical safety of natural persons or of a terrorist attack; (3) the detection,
localization, identification or prosecution of a perpetrator or suspect of a criminal
offence for a limited list of crimes of a certain relevance.219 The list of occasions
within which law enforcement can deploy AFR technologies is strikingly similar to
the types of watch-lists that the Court of Appeal scrutinized, although the Act is
certainly narrower and more precise.
As is standard under EU law, the Act requires that public bodies assess whether
the deployment of AFR is necessary and proportionate, in particular as regards the
temporal, geographic and personal limitation.220 They must consider the circumstances
before deploying AFR techniques. More specifically, they need to ponder the seriousness, probability and scale of the harm in case the AFR is or is not deployed.221
The teaching of Bridges about the necessity to adequately constrain police
powers to patrol publicly accessible places finds its parallel in the Acts requisite
that states willing to exploit AFRs capabilities for law enforcement purposes lay
down the necessary detailed rules for the carrying out of such activities.222 The Act
reiterates its preoccupation about the abusive exploitation of such technique to the
extent that it requires that each individual use of AFR is authorized by a judicial
authority or by an independent administrative authority, unless there is a justified
situation of urgency.223
The draft bill seems to have read Bridges accurately. It echoes the judgments
attempt to put boundaries to police powers, narrows its scope of utilization, and
ensures that it does not target specific individuals without a reason. Overall, the Act
makes clear that AFR technologies deployed in real-time must pursue public goals
of a considerable relevance, as their sheer deployment tends to transform the
patrolling of public places into mass-surveillance hubs.
CONCLUSION: IS AFR ANY GOOD? A EUROPEAN LESSON
At a superficial level, AFR deployments may not seem to be invasive. What the
CJEU has already said about fingerprints could be considered as particularly
revealing: [T]his is not an operation of an intimate nature. Nor does it cause any
particular physical or mental discomfort to the person affected any more than when
219
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that persons facial image is taken.224 EU populations also seem to approve the deployment of AFR technologies, especially for police purposes.225 But actually AFR
does capture the unique features of an individuals face. 226 Although it does not
require any cooperation from the individual,227 it certainly has a deep impact on
social relations, as a false positive match . . . automatically make[s] a suspect of somebody that is perfectly innocent.228 Cautious legal approaches discouraging vast
deployments of AFR are therefore fully justified.
The EUs legal position does not endorse massive deployments of mass surveillance systems in general. In accordance with the European Convention of Human
Rights and its Courts jurisprudence,229 the Court of Justice of the EU has rejected
this prospective time and again,230 criticizing the undiscriminated collection or retention
of personal data even in cases of serious threats.231 The preoccupation that vast technological developments give rise to forms of mass surveillance has also lately surfaced
in the Artificial Intelligence Act, now under consideration of EU bodies.232 The priority in protecting information about individuals is of such paramount importance
that it has even put EU law and its Court in route of collision with the U.S. antiterrorism measures.233
The Court of Appeals judgment seems to reflect the EUs approach within the
context of AFR deployments. Although the UK is not part of the EU anymore,
national regulations stemming from EU law have shaped so much of the Court of
Appeals ruling that domestic judges of other national jurisdictions within the EU
are likely to look at Bridges as a rather authoritative precedent. Even the Court of
224
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Justice of the EU, which has the monopoly of EU law interpretation,234 is unlikely
to ignore it. And, given that even in the United States the judicial rulings on this
matter are a handful at best,235 the impact of Bridgess might be influential also
across the Atlantic.
Regardless of the UKs departure from the EU, that country is likely to retain
a moderate approach to the AFR and its immense capabilities. Within the UK, there
is increasing political and social awareness that also in sensitive fields, like defense
and security, AI exploit data that is invariably uncertain, incomplete and contradictory . . . [s]ometimes it is also intentionally misleading,236 and that AIs outputs
must therefore be handled with caution. This is encouraging new models of interaction between AI-based tools and human agents. The UK governments agenda sees the
software work[ing] in closer partnership with the humans involved, and protocols
ensur[ing that] the ensuing decisions and plans can be understood and justified. 237
This line of thinking clearly resonates with the preoccupations of the Court of Appeal
and corroborates the scenario of AI supporting, and not replacing, humans in the
context of AFR deployments.
There are therefore visible signs that a culture is building up in the EU as well
as the UK that is conscious of the threats posed by AFR techniques, even when they
are deployed to serve police purposes. Such culture is particularly needed as police
corps in more than one EU countries have started testing AFR,238 and the EU is
presently funding several research projects on the potential application of facial
recognition technology in the area of security and border management.239 Whilst
[r]oughly half of all American adults are already profiled in one or another American law enforcement agencies facial-recognition database,240 if EU courts follow
Bridgess groundbreaking ruling, until EU enacts its draft bill on Artificial Intelligence, it is very unlikely that EU member states will build up comparable facial
databases of their citizens and alien residents.
Bridges ruled out the hypothetical development of technologically advanced
mass-surveillance systems by putting strong limitations on how watch-lists can be
compiled and utilized.241 But the perils of AI are not circumscribed to such a possibility.
234
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AIs mistakes are among the core concerns within the sphere of AFR deployments.242
More specifically, some individuals might be more vulnerable to AFR technologies
than others because of their ethnic background or their gender.243 The Court of
Appeal echoed such widespread concerns244 and displayed a heightened knowledge
of the problem, as it stigmatized the South Wales Polices superficial approach to
the possibility that AFR Locate may develop biases. On the contrary, it stated that
AFR Locates algorithm needed both to be sufficiently transparent so that public
institutions can review it and to include a diversified training dataset.245
Correcting biases is sometimes problematic. As some have pointed out, antidiscrimination laws may prevent from assess[ing] and mitigat[ing] bias in algorithmic systems, because adjustments intended to fight prejudices can be perceived as
incorporating biases themselves.246 Thankfully, AFR technologies do not seem particularly problematic in this respect. Taking care of potential biases here does not
seem to include adjusting the treatment of the AFRs matches to mitigate its potentially discriminatory impact. AFR tools may be improved simply by making the
training more balanced.247
The Court of Appeals prudent approach to AFR was grounded in the reality
that complex algorithms . . . may mask discriminatory practices.248 The ruling,
however, was still quite optimistic about AFR Locates capabilities. The Court was
not aware of the performance of AFR Locate during the UEFA Championship final
in Cardiff. AFRs deployment then covered one whole week.249 As the South Wales
Police admitted in responding to an individuals inquiry about the treatment of
242
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personal information, during that week the software returned 173 true positive alerts
and 2,297 false positive alerts,250 with a false positive ratio of 92%.251
Finally, the Court of Appeal gave a realistic consideration of the role of the
human supervisors in charge of checking the match between the watch-list and the
cameras before taking action. While the Court acknowledged the importance of such
protocol to avoid misidentifications, it also gave weight to the impact that algorithms
actually have on human decision makers.252 In fact, there is evidence that human override of an AI outcome is likely to happen only when the result from the algorithm
is not in line with [the humans] stereotypes.253 The combination of human biases
with human overconfidence in AFR can therefore perpetuate and reinforce clichés
and prejudices instead of preventing them.
The Court of Appeals judgment focused also on the possibility that excessively
discretionary police powers weaponize the AFRs potential to target specific persons.254
Unfettered powers to deploy AFR tools can become insidious, facially neutral ways
for the police to chase certain individuals. Only adequate protocols, which lay out
how the watch-lists are made and where the technology is deployed, and which
courts can review, are able to keep these dangers under check. Warning the public that
AFR is operating in a certain area does not waive police forces from such obligations.
As the Court of Appeal noted, despite the actions taken by the police to inform the
public that an AFR system was operating, many could not be made aware of it.255
Bridges did not encourage general bans on AFR tools. Neither EU law nor the
ECHRs privacy protection rules out the deployment of AFR, after all.256 Such rights,
in fact, are not absolute rights, but must be considered in relation to their function
in society.257 As long as their limitations are provided for by law, respect the essence
of those rights, and, in accordance with the principle of proportionality, are necessary
and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognized by the Union or the need
to protect the rights and freedom or others,258 they are permitted. This is also the approach of the draft bill of the Artificial Intelligence Act that the European Commission
250
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has put forward: while it rules out the usage of AFR technologies for law enforcement
in general, it does carve out some limited exception that may deserve its usage.259
Bridges did put some limitations on what police can do with AFR-based technologies. First, it preserved the EUs general rule that individuals should not be
subject to a decision based solely on automated decision-making.260 Second, it
required that AFR deployments follow precise protocols as to whom to include in
the watch-lists and where to utilize such tools.261 Third, it gave thorough consideration to the risks of discrimination, requiring police forces to do what is feasible to
avoid biases and allowing the inspection of the code also at the expense of intellectual propertys protection.262
Finally, by finding the police powers to deploy AFR too broad and discretionary,
Bridges resonated with the calls for [a]n adequate regulatory framework as an
essential element to direct AI towards the good and welfare of individuals and society,
and showcased the insufficiency of the existing regulatory instruments that are in place
even within public bodies.263 As novel technologies routinely require that policymakers
develop new regulatory frameworks,264 Bridges adamantly stated that new, adequate
regulations are an imperative if such technologies are deployed by public bodies.265
The draft bill of the Artificial Intelligence Act now under consideration of EU
bodies seems to heed Bridgess calls more than the European lukewarm concern for
the deployment of AFR.266 Peoples within the EU do not seem to display public
movements of a scale and passion267 that can be compared to the popular wave
against massive deployments of intrusive technologies that is mounting in the United
States, effectively forcing legislative bodies to ensure that such tools comply with
basic legal and ethical values.268 As terrorist attacks and later the pandemic have greatly
affected their social and individual lives, Europeans are more inclined to give credit
to AFR. The Artificial Intelligence Act, however, does display a heightened sense
of concern that AFR may disrupt the social cohesion and the enjoyment of fundamental rights such as the freedom to assembly. Time will tell what prevails in the EU
between the fears of terrorism and the pandemic or of AFR technologies.
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